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NOTES
REGULATING RARE DISEASE:
SAFELY FACILITATING ACCESS
TO ORPHAN DRUGS
Julien B. Bannister*
While approximately one in ten Americans suffers from a rare disease,
only 5 percent of rare diseases have a U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approved treatment. Congressional and regulatory efforts to
stimulate the development of rare-disease treatments, while laudable, have
not resolved the fundamental issues surrounding rare-disease treatment
development. Indeed, small patient populations, incomplete scientific
understanding of rare diseases, and high development costs continually limit
the availability of rare-disease treatments.
To illustrate the struggle of developing and approving safe rare-disease
treatments, this Note begins by discussing the approval of Eteplirsen, the first
drug approved for treating a rare disease called Duchenne muscular
dystrophy. After exploring the current drug regulation system and how this
impacts the availability of rare-disease treatments, this Note examines the
21st Century Cures Act’s patient experience data provisions and the
currently pending Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act. Ultimately, the unmet
therapeutic needs of rare-disease patients can be met while protecting patient
safety, this Note reasons that, if carefully implemented, the 21st Century
Cures Act and the Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act could work in tandem to
safely facilitate patient access to rare-disease treatments.
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INTRODUCTION
“I wish my son had cancer,” Alex Smith admitted following his son’s
diagnosis with Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD).1 DMD is a rare,2
fatal, and until recently, largely untreatable3 genetic disorder that causes
gradual muscular degeneration.4 Most DMD sufferers lose the ability to walk
by their teens, can no longer eat or use the bathroom independently by their
1. Alex Smith, ‘I Wish My Son Had Cancer’: How Shock Tactics Raised My Charity’s
Profile, GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2014, 3:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/voluntarysector-network/2014/aug/11/wish-my-son-had-cancer-shock-tactics-charity-advertisingcampaign [https://perma.cc/JTK6-UC75].
2. In the United States, a rare disease is defined as a disease affecting fewer than 200,000
people nationwide. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2012); see also Benjamin Elgin et al., When
the Patient Is a Gold Mine: The Trouble with Rare-Disease Drugs, BLOOMBERG (May 24,
2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-05-24/when-the-patientis-a-gold-mine-the-trouble-with-rare-disease-drugs [https://perma.cc/3PZ4-9MJ8]. However,
calling DMD a rare disease is somewhat of a misnomer, considering that DMD is one of the
“biggest genetic killers of boys worldwide.” Marcia Kaye, The Gene Editors, U. TORONTO
MAG., Summer 2016, at 35. Indeed, there are approximately 15,000 boys living with DMD
in the United States and 300,000 worldwide. What Is Duchenne?, CUREDUCHENNE,
https://www.cureduchenne.org/about/what-is-duchenne/ [https://perma.cc/CG2R-E6V3] (last
visited Feb. 14, 2018).
3. See Nick Taussig, Our Beautiful Sons Could Die Before Us, GUARDIAN (Aug. 16,
2014, 12:59 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2014/aug/16/our-beautifulsons-could-die-before-us [https://perma.cc/H248-ES3G].
4. See What Is Duchenne?, supra note 2.
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twenties, and die by their thirties.5 Alex explained, “I felt a cancer diagnosis
would have more options . . . a chance to try something—a chance that those
with DMD . . . don’t have.”6 Nick Taussig felt similarly helpless after
learning that his son had DMD and struggled to explain the severity of the
diagnosis to friends and family:
“What’s the treatment?” There is no treatment. “What about steroids?”
They do little more than postpone the inevitable by a few years. “Might
there be a scientific breakthrough?” Possibly, though we cannot count on
it. “How are you?” We’re OK, when what we really wanted to say was,
we’re drowning.7

A DMD breakthrough occurred in September 2016: the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approved Eteplirsen, the first drug8 for treating
DMD.9 Using data from an initial clinical study involving just twelve
subjects and lacking a placebo control, drug sponsor10 Sarepta Therapeutics
requested that the FDA grant Eteplirsen accelerated approval.11 While this
data showed that Eteplirsen only slightly increased dystrophin12
production,13 several trial participants insisted that they had grown stronger
since taking Eteplirsen.14

5. Lisa M. Jarvis, After Eteplirsen: Duchenne Stakeholders Contemplate What Comes
Next, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (Nov. 14, 2016), http://cen.acs.org/articles/94/i45/
eteplirsen-Duchenne-stakeholders-contemplate-comes.html [https://perma.cc/7BB2-GZC4].
6. Smith, supra note 1.
7. Taussig, supra note 3.
8. This Note uses the term “drug” to refer to prescription medications only and to
encompass both drugs and biological products.
9. See Jarvis, supra note 5; Sy Mukherjee, The FDA Just Made Its Most Controversial
Drug Approval of the Year, FORTUNE (Sept. 19, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/19/fdadrug-approval-exondys-51/ [https://perma.cc/2PV4-PRJP].
10. Typically, a drug’s sponsor is its manufacturer or potential marketer. See
Investigational
New
Drug
(IND)
Application,
FDA
(Oct.
5,
2017),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapprove
d/approvalapplications/investigationalnewdrugindapplication/default.htm
[https://perma.cc/Z4VK-QFP2].
11. See Jarvis, supra note 5. The FDA created the Accelerated Approval Program to
hasten approval of drugs designed to treat serious conditions and that fulfill unmet medical
needs. Accelerated Approval Program, FDA (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/
Drugs/ResourcesForYou/HealthProfessionals/ucm313768.htm
[https://perma.cc/6QG7AWQR]; see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.500 (2017). A drug must have demonstrated clinical benefit
to enter the U.S. market; however, a drug granted accelerated approval can demonstrate
clinical benefit using a “surrogate endpoint”—a marker (in the Eteplirsen case, dystrophin
levels) that predicts clinical benefit—rather than traditionally required functional endpoints
(such as life span) which measure clinical benefit, thereby shortening the length of clinical
trials. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.500; Jarvis, supra note 5.
12. Dystrophin is a protein that “keeps muscle cells intact.” Duchenne Muscular
Dystrophy, MUSCULAR DYSTROPHY ASS’N, https://www.mda.org/disease/duchenne-musculardystrophy [https://perma.cc/W8V5-TZBJ] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).
13. This data showed that, on average, Eteplirsen increased dystrophin levels by just 0.9
percent of the level seen in someone without DMD. Jarvis, supra note 5.
14. See id.
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An FDA advisory committee reviewed the initial study data and listened
to the testimonies of DMD patients, their families, and their doctors.15 Those
testifying included a fifteen-year-old patient who declared that he would
“beat this bloody disease,” while pleading with the FDA to not “let [him] die
early”; a patient’s mother, who declared that she “[was] not just [a] desperate
parent[]” and claimed to “have witnessed the efficacy of [Eteplirsen]”; and a
physician who requested the “option to prescribe Eteplirsen,” because “[w]e
cannot withhold a safe drug from even one boy who may benefit.”16 The
committee nonetheless concluded that Sarepta had not provided “substantial
evidence” from “adequate and well-controlled” studies that Eteplirsen was
safe and effective for treating DMD and therefore recommended that the
FDA not approve the drug.17
The FDA, however, disregarded the advice of the advisory committee and
conditionally approved Eteplirsen.18 Announcing Eteplirsen’s approval,
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) Director Janet Woodcock
noted, “In rare diseases, new drug development is especially challenging due
to the small numbers of people affected by each disease and the lack of
medical understanding of many disorders.”19 While Eteplirsen’s approval
overjoyed the DMD community,20 some critics argued that there was no
empirical evidence that Eteplirsen safely and effectively treated DMD, and
they pointed to the lobbying campaign undertaken by DMD advocates as
having biased the approval decision.21
This Note begins with the Eteplirsen story because it illustrates the
difficulty of drug regulation in the context of rare diseases. As recognized
by the FDA in approving Eteplirsen, rare-disease patients have limited
therapeutic options.22 And, as illustrated by the comments of Alex Smith and
Nick Taussig, the limited availability of medical treatments causes raredisease patients and their loved ones much distress.23 However, with
tragedies like thalidomide24 in the not-too-distant past, it is troubling that any
15. See Kyle T. Edwards, The Role of Patient Participation in Drug Approvals: Lessons
from the Accelerated Approval of Eteplirsen, 72 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 406, 407–08 (2017).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 408.
18. The approval was conditioned on Sarepta conducting additional clinical testing to
demonstrate Eteplirsen’s safety and efficacy in treating DMD. See Mukherjee, supra note 9.
19. Press Release, FDA, FDA Grants Accelerated Approval to First Drug for Duchenne
Muscular Dystrophy (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/
pressannouncements/ucm521263.htm [https://perma.cc/BTC8-Q2MU].
20. See Muscular Dystrophy Ass’n, Eteplirsen Approved in US for Treatment of
Duchenne
Muscular
Dystrophy,
SCIENCEDAILY
(Sept.
20,
2016),
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/09/160920095640.htm [https://perma.cc/Q874D5T7].
21. See Mukherjee, supra note 9.
22. See Press Release, FDA, supra note 19; see also infra Part I.B.1.
23. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
24. The United States’ rigorous drug regulations are commonly understood as a reaction
to the thalidomide tragedy of the late 1950s and early 1960s. See Margaret Hamburg, 50 Years
After Thalidomide:
Why Regulation Matters, FDA VOICE (Feb. 7, 2012),
https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2012/02/50-years-after-thalidomide-whyregulation-matters/ [https://perma.cc/DJ5L-5AP5]. Outside of the United States, many
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new drug could be approved using data from a twelve-person study that did
not demonstrate significant clinical benefit,25 as was Eteplirsen.
Two recent items of legislation may benefit rare-disease patients by
allowing these patients to play a more active role in the drug regulation
process.26 First, section 3001 of the 21st Century Cures Act, passed by
Congress in 2016,27 permits the FDA to consider “patient experience data”
in approving new drugs.28 Second, in August 2017, the Senate passed the
Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina
Right to Try Act of 2017 (“Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act”),29 which, if
made law, would make available—without FDA approval—investigational
drugs30 to any person with a “life-threatening disease or condition” who has
exhausted available treatments and who cannot participate in any ongoing
clinical trials.31
This Note considers the value of increased patient participation in the drug
regulation process, particularly for those suffering from rare diseases such as
DMD. Part I details the current landscape of drug approval and access,
principally discussing the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the
Orphan Drug Act (ODA), the FDA’s patient engagement initiatives and its
doctors prescribed thalidomide to pregnant women suffering from morning sickness and
insomnia, but the drug was later found to cause birth defects. See id.; About Thalidomide:
Thalidomide FAQs, THALIDOMIDE SOC’Y, http://www.thalidomidesociety.org/what-isthalidomide/ [https://perma.cc/52PB-JTZ4] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). Ultimately, over
24,000 thalidomide-affected babies were born and an additional 123,000 babies were
miscarried or stillborn due to thalidomide consumption in pregnancy. About Thalidomide:
Thalidomide FAQs, supra.
25. A drug demonstrates clinical benefit if it results in the “prolongation of survival or an
improvement in symptoms.” FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CLINICAL TRIAL ENDPOINTS FOR
THE APPROVAL OF CANCER DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS 2 (2007).
26. Patient participation in drug approvals is not a novel concept—in fact, in recent years,
the FDA has launched several initiatives to include patients in the drug-approval and
development processes. See Edwards, supra note 15, at 411–23; see also infra Part I.B.2.
27. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3001, 130 Stat. 1033, 1083–84
(2016) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c(b)).
28. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c(b) (Supp. IV 2016). The 21st Century Cures Act defines
patient experience data as data intended to provide information about patient experience with
a disease or condition, including a disease’s impact on a patient’s life and patient treatment
preferences. Id.; see also 21st Century Cures Act—Provisions to Promote Drug Development,
ROPES & GRAY (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom/alerts/2016/
December/21st-Century-Cures-Act-Provisions-Relating-to-Promoting-DrugDevelopment.aspx [https://perma.cc/J3HA-XMZV].
29. S. 204, 115th Cong. (2017). In February 2017, Representative Andy Biggs introduced
House Bill 878, a companion bill to Senate Bill 204, in the House of Representatives, but the
House has not yet passed this bill. See H.R. 878, 115th Cong. (2017); Sarah Karlin-Smith &
Seung Min Kim, Senate Approves ‘Right-to-Try’ Drug Bill, POLITICO (Aug. 3, 2017, 6:45
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/03/senate-right-to-try-drug-bill-241293
[https://perma.cc/QU8R-3QKX]. This Note focuses on Senate Bill 204 because it has already
passed one chamber of Congress.
30. Investigational drugs are drugs that the FDA has approved for human testing but has
not yet approved to be marketed. See Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, supra note
10.
31. See S. 204 § 2(a); James M. Beck, Federal Right to Try Legislation—Is It Any Better?,
DRUG & DEVICE L. BLOG (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2017/
09/federal-right-to-try-legislation-is-it-any-better.html [https://perma.cc/3BEJ-ZS9Z].
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“Expanded Access” program. Part II describes section 3001 of the 21st
Century Cures Act, as well as the Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act, and
analyzes how these laws diverge from traditional safety requirements of drug
approval and access. Finally, Part III provides suggestions for implementing
section 3001 of the 21st Century Cures Act and amending the Trickett
Wendler Right to Try Act to help rare-disease patients access safe and
effective medical treatments.
Specifically, this Note argues that in implementing section 3001 of the 21st
Century Cures Act, the FDA should establish a review system that scrutinizes
both the source and substance of patient experience data submissions. This
will ensure that subjective data does not unfairly bias the otherwise objective
drug-approval process. Additionally, this Note proposes that the House of
Representatives pass the Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act after making
amendments to minimize the legal, regulatory, and financial risks for drug
sponsors of supplying patients with investigational drugs. In so doing,
however, the House must address the safety risks of facilitating access to
unapproved drugs by mandating patient counseling, requiring that patients
request investigational drugs anonymously, and encouraging patient
participation in clinical trials.
I. HOW PATIENTS ACCESS DRUGS: DRUG APPROVAL,
DEVELOPING DRUGS THAT MEET PATIENT NEEDS,
AND EXPANDED ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL THERAPIES
To appreciate the potential impact of the 21st Century Cures Act and the
Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act on rare-disease patients’ ability to access
medical treatments, it is necessary to review the current legal and regulatory
landscape of drug development, approval, and access. Part I.A details the
drug-approval process as governed by the FDCA. Part I.B considers how the
drug-approval process frustrates the development of rare-disease treatments
and discusses congressional and regulatory attempts to overcome these
difficulties through efforts such as the ODA and the FDA’s various patient
engagement initiatives. Finally, Part I.C examines how patients can currently
access unapproved drugs through the FDA’s Expanded Access program.
A. The Drug-Approval Process
Pursuant to the FDCA, new drugs, and new indications32 for already
approved drugs, must receive FDA approval to be marketed in the United
States.33 Securing marketing approval is a multistep process during which a

32. An indication is defined as “a particular use of a drug, such as treating asthma.” See
Approved Drug Uses, PUBMED HEALTH (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmedhealth/approved-drug-uses/ [https://perma.cc/8VC9-3Y4Y].
33. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012). This requirement comes from the 1962 amendments
to the FDCA (also known as the Kefauver-Harris Amendments), which were passed in
reaction to the thalidomide tragedy that swept Europe in the late 1950s and early 1960s. See
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 104, 76 Stat. 784 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 355(a)); Kefauver-Harris Amendments Revolutionized Drug Development, FDA
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drug’s sponsor submits to the FDA “everything about a drug”34 to establish
that it is “safe and effective for its intended use.”35
The specific requirements of drug approval are as follows. Before
commencing clinical testing, a drug sponsor must submit an investigational
new drug application (IND) to the FDA.36 The IND must contain preclinical
data demonstrating that the drug is safe enough for human testing.37 If the
FDA deems it sufficiently safe, the drug then undergoes a series of clinical
trials, beginning with small Phase I tests to ensure safety and ending with
longer, larger Phase III studies to test efficacy and to monitor adverse
reactions.38 After completing at least two “large, controlled clinical trials,”39
the drug’s sponsor must file a new drug application (NDA) for the drug to be
approved.40 The NDA must contain all data accumulated in preclinical and
clinical trials, as well as proposed product labeling, usage directions, safety
and abuse information, and other relevant details.41 CDER then decides
whether to approve the drug for marketing in the United States.42
(Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm322856.htm
[https://perma.cc/2GME-PB9K]; see also supra note 24.
34. Step 4: FDA Review, FDA (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/
Approvals/Drugs/ucm405570.htm [https://perma.cc/6E9F-BA7K].
35. See id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A). The FDA may refuse to approve a new
drug on multiple grounds: if it determines that the drug sponsor did not adequately test the
drug for safety and efficacy; if the data provided by the sponsor does not demonstrate that the
drug is safe; if the drug’s manufacturing, processing, or packing methods are inadequate to
preserve the drug; if there is insufficient information to determine whether a drug is safe; or if
there is a “lack of substantial evidence” that the drug will have the effect it purports to have.
See id. § 355(d).
36. See Step 3: Clinical Research, FDA (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/
Approvals/Drugs/ucm405622.htm [https://perma.cc/3EVN-FBB5].
37. See Development & Approval Process (Drugs), FDA (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ [https://perma.cc/B3M9-V7V3].
38. Step 3: Clinical Research, supra note 36.
39. See id.
40. Step 4: FDA Review, supra note 34. The approval process for biological products (a
type of drug that is derived from “living material,” such as some vaccines) differs slightly
from nonbiologic drugs. See Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological
Products, FDA (July 7, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBiologicApplicatio
ns/ucm113522.htm [https://perma.cc/22AX-PGMH]. If initial clinical trials show that a
biologic is safe and effective for its intended use, a biologic sponsor must submit a biologics
license application (BLA), as opposed to an NDA, to the FDA. See id. A BLA, like an NDA,
must contain all preclinical and clinical data and relevant product information, like a drug’s
proposed labeling. Biologics License Applications (BLA) Process (CBER), FDA (Jan. 5, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/BiologicsLicen
seApplicationsBLAProcess/default.htm [https://perma.cc/W45D-X29P]. To grant a license,
the FDA must determine “that the product, the manufacturing process, and the manufacturing
facilities meet applicable requirements to ensure the continued safety, purity[,] and potency of
the product.” Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological Products, supra.
41. Step 4: FDA Review, supra note 34.
42. Id. This process typically exceeds one year. Alexander Gaffney et al., Regulatory
Explainer: Everything You Need to Know About FDA’s Priority Review Vouchers, REG. AFF.
PROFESSIONALS SOC’Y (Dec. 19, 2017), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2015/
07/02/21722/Regulatory-Explainer-Everything-You-Need-to-Know-About-FDA’s-PriorityReview-Vouchers [https://perma.cc/CF9G-ABNF].
Priority review is available for
“promising therapies that treat a serious or life-threatening condition and provide therapeutic
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To approve a drug, CDER must determine that the drug’s benefits
outweigh its risks to the population it is intended to treat.43 To make this
determination, CDER reviews the drug’s NDA using a structured analytical
framework.44 First, CDER analyzes the disease or condition that the drug is
intended to treat and takes stock of already available treatments.45 CDER
then determines the drug’s benefits and risks by looking to clinical data
submitted by the drug sponsor and accounting for uncertainties that may
come from “imperfect or incomplete data.”46 Finally, CDER considers
whether any of the drug’s risks can be mitigated through the use of risk
management strategies, such as labeling that “clearly describes the drug’s
benefits and risks.”47 Despite this rigorous analysis, CDER approves most
drugs: for example, in 2015, CDER approved 96 percent of NDAs.48
B. Congressional and Regulatory Efforts
to Develop Rare-Disease Treatments
The rigorous drug-approval process costs drug manufacturers much time
and money.49 These costs have historically encouraged drug manufacturers
to concentrate their development efforts on drugs whose profits exceed the
massive costs of approval—typically “blockbuster” drugs that treat common
health conditions, like hypertension.50 Consequently, most rare diseases—
also known as orphan diseases—lack an FDA-approved treatment.51 Part
I.B.1 considers how Congress and the FDA have tried to stimulate raredisease drug development. It focuses on Congress’s passage of the ODA and
the establishment the “Priority Review Voucher” program for rare pediatric
diseases. Part I.B.2 reviews the FDA’s more general efforts to solicit patient
benefit over available therapies.” Development & Approval Process (Drugs), supra note 37.
Priority review is helpful “when the drug is meant to treat a disease whose course is long, and
an extended period of time is needed to measure its effect.” Id. After approval, however, the
drug sponsor must conduct additional clinical trials to confirm the drug’s safety and efficacy.
See id.
43. Development & Approval Process (Drugs), supra note 37.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. Matthew Herper, The FDA Is Basically Approving Everything. Here’s The Data to
Prove It, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2015, 8:53 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/
2015/08/20/the-fda-is-basically-approving-everything-heres-the-data-to-proveit/#18de3b005e0a [https://perma.cc/X4KC-PCWV].
49. Indeed, a 2014 study concluded that the average cost of getting a prescription drug on
the market was $2.6 billion and took at least ten years. Rick Mullin, Cost to Develop New
Pharmaceutical Drug Now Exceeds $2.5 B, SCI. AM. (Nov. 24, 2014),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cost-to-develop-new-pharmaceutical-drug-nowexceeds-2-5b/ [https://perma.cc/GCK6-MR9U].
50. See Peter Ubel, Is The Golden Era Of Pharmaceutical Profits Over?, FORBES (July
29, 2016, 11:59 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterubel/2016/07/29/is-the-goldenera-of-pharmaceutical-profits-over/#27974f737207 [https://perma.cc/Y2PQ-ECHV].
51. Jan Ascher et al., How to Successfully Launch a Rare Disease Drug in a PatientCentric World, MCKINSEY & CO. (Jan. 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/
pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/how-to-successfully-launch-a-raredisease-drug-in-a-patient-centric-world [https://perma.cc/4X8K-3Z4M].
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feedback in drug development and approvals, including “Patient-Focused
Drug Development” meetings, the “Patient Representative Program,” and the
possible launch of an office of patient affairs.
1. Incentivizing the Development of Rare-Disease Treatments
Considered collectively, rare diseases are not as rare as their name
suggests.52 Indeed, it is estimated that one in ten Americans has a rare
disease.53 However, approximately 95 percent of rare diseases lack an FDAapproved treatment—hence the term orphan diseases.54
Prior to the ODA’s passage, pharmaceutical companies hesitated to
develop rare-disease drugs because, “[d]ue to the rarity of the conditions and
limited demand for treatments,”55 there was “no reasonable expectation [that]
the sales of the drug[s would] recover the costs.”56 Under pressure from
advocacy groups like the National Organization for Rare Disorders
(NORD),57 Congress passed the ODA in 1983 to encourage drug
manufacturers to develop rare-disease, or orphan, drugs.58
The ODA financially incentivizes rare-disease59 drug development by
providing orphan-drug developers60 with tax credits61 and grants to fund drug
development.62 The ODA also permits new orphan drugs seven years of
52. See Elgin et al., supra note 2.
1
(2016),
53. Rare
Disease
Facts, NAT’L ORG. RARE DISORDERS
http://cdn.rarediseases.org/wordpresscontent/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/NRD-1008FactSheet_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XBX-26Y2].
54. See Ascher et al., supra note 51.
55. Taeho Greg Rhee, Policymaking for Orphan Drugs and Its Challenges, 17 AM. MED.
ASS’N J. ETHICS 776, 776 (2015).
56. Id. (quoting RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN PRODUCTS: ACCELERATING RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT (T.F. Boat & M.L. Field eds., 2010)).
57. Id.
58. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15, 21, 26, 35, and 42 U.S.C.); see also Gayatri Rao, The Rise of
Orphan Drug Designations: Meeting the Growing Demand, FDA VOICE (July 18, 2016),
https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/tag/orphan-drug-act/
[https://perma.cc/3ZETZQC8]. Additionally, in 2002, Congress authorized the creation of the Office of Rare Diseases
Research (ORDR) at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) by passing the Rare Diseases Act.
See Rare Diseases Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-280, § 3, 116 Stat. 1988, 1989–90 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 287a-1 (2012)). The Rare Diseases Act did not specifically incentivize orphandrug development but rather encouraged rare disease research by mandating that the ORDR
conduct, and provide funding for, research into rare diseases. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 287a to 287a2 (2012).
59. The ODA, as originally enacted, provided that a rare disease or condition occurs with
such infrequency that a drug for treating such a disease cannot not be reasonably expected to
recoup the costs of production. See Orphan Drug Act § 2(a). Today, however, a rare disease
is also defined as a disease that affects fewer than 200,000 people in the United States. See 21
U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2012).
60. The FDA must grant a drug “orphan designation” before its sponsor can take
advantage of the ODA’s incentives. Designating an Orphan Product: Drugs and Biological
Products, FDA (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/DevelopingProducts
forRareDiseasesConditions/HowtoapplyforOrphanProductDesignation/default.htm
[https://perma.cc/Q9XF-LPXV].
61. See I.R.C. § 45C (2012); Rhee, supra note 56.
62. See 21 U.S.C. § 360ee; Rhee, supra note 56.
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market exclusivity in the United States.63 Furthermore, the ODA provides
that orphan-drug sponsors can request, and the FDA can provide, written
recommendations regarding “non-clinical and clinical investigations” that
“would be necessary for [the drug’s] approval.”64 These incentives have
proven effective: since the ODA’s passage, the FDA has approved more than
600 orphan drugs, compared to ten approvals in the decade before the ODA
became law.65
In 2012, the FDA launched the Priority Review Voucher program for rare
pediatric diseases.66 These vouchers are designed to incentivize drug makers
to develop treatments for rare pediatric diseases by shortening the approval
review period.67 After successfully requesting a priority review voucher
from the FDA,68 the drug sponsor must inform the FDA of its intent to use
the voucher for an upcoming NDA submission.69 If the FDA accepts the
voucher, it agrees to review the drug for marketing approval within six
months.70 As of December 2017, the FDA has awarded thirteen priority
review vouchers for rare pediatric disease treatments.71
Despite the progress made by the ODA and the Priority Review Voucher
program, the fact remains that most rare diseases lack an FDA-approved
therapy.72 Multiple factors continue to hinder orphan-drug development. For
one, small patient populations make it hard to find enough patients on whom
to test orphan drugs in a statistically significant manner.73 Particularly
desperate patients may resist participating in clinical trials for fear of
receiving a placebo and thus not experiencing relief.74 Furthermore, drug
63. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc; Elgin et al., supra note 2. New non-orphan drugs, once
approved, have three to five years of market exclusivity. Elgin et al., supra note 2.
64. 21 U.S.C. § 360aa.
65. Elgin et al., supra note 2. In fact, 41 percent of all drugs brought to market in 2014
were orphan drugs. Id. In June 2017, the FDA announced its “Orphan Drug Modernization
Plan” under which it eliminated a backlog of 200 orphan drug applications and “pledged to
never allow such a backlog to accumulate again.” Scott Gottlieb, FDA Is Advancing the Goals
of
the
Orphan
Drug
Act,
FDA
VOICE
(Sept.
12,
2017),
https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2017/09/fda-is-advancing-the-goals-of-the-orphandrug-act/ [https://perma.cc/88W6-GK5R].
66. See Gaffney et al., supra note 42. A rare pediatric disease affects less than 200,000
people under the age of eighteen in the United States. See id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360ff(a)(3).
67. See 21 U.S.C. § 360ff(a)(1); Gaffney et al., supra note 42.
68. See 21 U.S.C. § 360ff(b)(1); Rare Pediatric Disease Priority Review Vouchers Draft
Guidance,
FDA
13–15
(2014),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM423325.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PY99-CAN5] (detailing the process that drug sponsors must follow to
request a Priority Review Voucher from the FDA). Interestingly, Priority Review Voucher
recipients may transfer a voucher to another drug sponsor, even by sale. 21 U.S.C.
§ 360ff(b)(2).
69. See 21 U.S.C. § 360ff(b)(4); Gaffney et al., supra note 42.
70. Gaffney et al., supra note 42; see 21 U.S.C. § 360ff(a)(1).
71. Gaffney et al., supra note 42.
72. Ascher et al., supra note 51.
73. See Rare Diseases and Expanded Access Policies, MAPI, http://mapigroup.com/
services/real-world-evidence/rare-diseases-expanded-access-programs/
[https://perma.cc/G7PQ-GPYD] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).
74. See, e.g., Design Dilemma: The Debate over Using Placebos in Cancer Clinical
Trials, NAT’L CANCER INST. (May 3, 2011), https://www.cancer.gov/about-
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makers prefer to develop drugs that treat “more common” rare diseases
because they are more profitable, leaving many “truly rare diseases” without
treatments.75 With an appreciation of the factors that limit orphan-drug
development, it is perhaps easier to understand why the FDA conditionally
approved Eteplirsen for treating DMD on such limited data.76
2. The FDA and Patient Engagement
Historically, drug approval was a paternalistic endeavor, with the FDA
alone determining whether a drug could enter the U.S. market.77 Recently,
however, the FDA has solicited feedback directly from patients to develop
and approve treatments that better fulfill patient needs, as defined by patients
themselves.78 While this push for patient engagement does not explicitly
target the needs of rare-disease patients, it does so incidentally because so
many rare-disease patients have unmet therapeutic needs.79
In 2012, the FDA began holding “Patient-Focused Drug Development”
meetings.80 In these public, disease-specific meetings, the FDA consults
seriously ill patients who lack adequate treatment options to understand what
these patients want and need out of the drug development process.81
Additionally, the FDA’s Office of Health and Constituent Affairs manages
cancer/treatment/research/placebo-clinical-trials [https://perma.cc/7NT9-J7KV].
For
example, Mary Schwartz’s rare cancer was cured by experimental chemotherapy she received
in a Phase II clinical trial, but she claims that she would not have enrolled in the trial had it
been placebo controlled: “Because of the rarity of my cancer and the almost certainty of
fatality, I would not have chosen to participate if there had been a possibility of getting a
placebo.” Id.
75. See Rhee, supra note 56, at 777. Moreover, drug sponsors are free to price their
products in a manner that maximizes profit; resultantly, orphan drugs may be prohibitively
expensive for patients to access. Id.
76. See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.
77. See Edwards, supra note 15, at 413.
78. See Andrew Matthius, How Patient-Centric Is the Pharma Industry?, PDD (June 6,
2016) [hereinafter Matthius, How Patient-Centric Is the Pharma Industry?],
https://www.pddinnovation.com/blog/2016/06/how-patient-centric-is-the-pharma-industry/
[https://perma.cc/2VUD-Y7WC]. Drug manufacturers have also taken an interest in patient
engagement, also referred to in the pharmaceutical industry as patient-centricity. Id. Indeed,
most major pharmaceutical companies have undertaken patient engagement initiatives in
recent years. Id. For example, in 2014, Sanofi (a large international pharmaceutical company)
appointed Dr. Anne Beal to the role of Chief Patient Officer—a first-of-a-kind role that
involves “elevating the patient perspective within Sanofi.” Andrew Matthius, The Secret to
True Patient Centricity from Big Pharma’s First Chief Patient Officer, PM360 (Mar. 18,
2015),
https://www.pm360online.com/the-secret-to-true-patient-centricity-from-bigpharmas-first-chief-patient-officer/ [https://perma.cc/N5DZ-VANS]. One reason for this push
toward patient-centricity may be the perceived impact of patient-centricity on pharmaceutical
companies’ bottom lines: one study reported that 85 percent of surveyed pharmaceutical
executives believed that patient engagement efforts boost profitability. Matthius, How PatientCentric Is the Pharma Industry?, supra.
79. See Ascher et al., supra note 51.
80. See Alexander Gaffney, Patient-Focused Drug Development Tracker, REG. AFF.
PROFESSIONALS
SOC’Y
(July
1,
2015),
http://www.raps.org/RegulatoryFocus/News/Databases/2015/07/01/19640/Patient-Focused-Drug-Development-Tracker/
[https://perma.cc/D6NE-FQHL].
81. Id.

1900

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

the “Patient Representative” program.82 Patient Representatives sit on FDA
advisory committees, confer with doctors and scientists engaged in the
approval of medical products, and participate in FDA meetings concerning
specific diseases and policy issues to ensure that patients are represented in
the drug-development and approval processes.83 Furthermore, in March
2017, the FDA announced that it was considering creating an “office of
patient affairs” to coordinate patient engagement across the pharmaceutical
industry.84 The office would facilitate patient engagement by hosting and
maintaining data management systems to help patient groups communicate
with the FDA.85
Viewed in the context of these ongoing efforts to involve patients in the
drug-approval and access process, the 21st Century Cures Act and the
Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act do not seem like drastic departures from
longstanding precedent but rather a logical next step in an ongoing journey
toward a drug regulation system in which patients are directly involved.
C. The FDA’s Expanded Access Program:
Accessing Investigational Drugs Outside of Clinical Trials
Patients who have exhausted approved treatments for a given disease or
condition without experiencing clinical benefit can access experimental
treatments in two ways. Patients may qualify for a clinical trial, or, if this is
impossible,86 they can seek to obtain a drug through the FDA’s Expanded

82. See Office of Health and Constituent Affairs, FDA (July 21, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OC/OfficeofExternalAffairs/ucm343095
.htm [https://perma.cc/M3NH-UEGX].
83. See About the Patient Representative Program, FDA (Jan. 31, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/forpatients/patientengagement/ucm412709.htm#Criteria
[https://perma.cc/3EG7-D239].
84. Zachary Brennan, FDA Considers Creating New ‘Office of Patient Affairs’, REG. AFF.
PROFESSIONALS
SOC’Y
(Mar.
13,
2017),
http://www.raps.org/RegulatoryFocus/News/2017/03/13/27103/FDA-Considers-Creating-New-Office-of-Patient-Affairs/
[https://perma.cc/Q8KV-ZZLZ].
85. Id.
86. See Expanded Access:
Information for Patients, FDA (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Other/ExpandedAccess/ucm20041768.htm#different-types
[https://perma.cc/X9UK-QWY5] (noting that, to grant an Expanded Access request, the FDA
must determine that the patient cannot participate in an ongoing clinical trial). Logistically,
participating in a clinical trial can be difficult: assuming that there is an ongoing trial for a
drug that could treat a patient’s disease, clinical trials can last up to four years. Step 3: Clinical
Research, supra note 36. A patient may need to travel to the trial site, which could make it
hard to keep a job and tend to one’s family. See Clinical Trial Financial Assistance, PATIENT
EMPOWERMENT
NETWORK,
https://powerfulpatients.org/project/clinical-trial-financialassistance/ [https://perma.cc/B8ZT-3MGZ] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). While insurance
companies and drug sponsors sometimes pay for a patient’s treatment in a clinical trial, other
related costs fall on the patient, such as travel, childcare, and follow-up doctor visits. Id.
Moreover, there is no guarantee that there will be a clinical trial with eligibility criteria (e.g.,
age, sex, medical history, and current health status) that a given patient will meet. See What
Are Eligibility Criteria, and Why Are They Important?, ROSWELL PARK,
https://www.roswellpark.org/clinical-trials/eligibility-criteria
[https://perma.cc/D9ZNTKM4] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). Additionally, the stakes may be so high that patients are
unwilling to participate in placebo trials for fear of receiving a placebo and thus being further
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Access program.87 This program grants seriously ill patients access to
experimental drugs outside of clinical trials.88 The Expanded Access
program therefore performs the important function of helping patients who
cannot participate in clinical trials to access experimental drugs and thereby
treat, or attempt to treat, their illnesses. Indeed, access to experimental drugs
is especially important in the rare-disease context, given the limited
availability of approved therapies.89
To obtain an investigational drug through the Expanded Access program,
a physician must petition the FDA to grant his or her patient access to the
drug.90 This physician must be willing to oversee the patient’s treatment and
work with the FDA and the drug sponsor to obtain the investigational drug.91
Additionally, the physician must ensure that the patient gives informed
consent to using the investigational drug and that an Institutional Review
Board (IRB) approves the patient’s use of the experimental drug.92
To approve an Expanded Access request, the FDA must determine that the
patient has a “serious”93 or “immediately life-threatening”94 illness for which
there is no other available treatment and that the patient cannot otherwise

distanced from relief or cure. See Design Dilemma: The Debate over Using Placebos in Cancer
Clinical Trials, supra note 74.
87. See Expanded Access: Information for Patients, supra note 86; see also Bob Tedeschi,
With Patients Demanding Experimental Drugs, ‘Right to Try’ Is Becoming the Law of the
Land, STAT (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/03/23/right-to-try/
[https://perma.cc/EJ8E-666C].
88. See Expanded Access: Information for Patients, supra note 86.
89. Meg Tirrell, When Unapproved Drugs Are the Only Hope, CNBC (Aug. 5, 2014),
https://www.cnbc.com/2014/08/05/a-case-for-compassionate-use-when-unapproved-drugsare-the-only-hope.html [https://perma.cc/F48L-5KW8].
90. See Expanded Access: Information for Patients, supra note 86. To utilize the
Expanded Access program, a physician must complete an IND application on the patient’s
behalf. Id. Once the FDA approves the IND, the drug maker ships the drug to the physician,
who then dispenses it to the patient. Id. The FDA recognizes three categories of Expanded
Access: Expanded Access for individual patients (which may be for emergency use), midsized patient populations, and widespread use. Id. Because the most popular category is
individual use, this Note details the individual use Expanded Access category. See Jonathan J.
Darrow et al., Practical, Legal and Ethical Issues in Expanded Access to Investigational
Drugs, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 279, 279 (2015).
91. Expanded Access: Information for Patients, supra note 86.
92. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(c)(4) (2017). Historically, a physician also had to seek the
approval of an entire institutional review board (IRB) or an ethics committee for an IND before
the FDA would approve an Expanded Access request. Expanded Access: Information for
Patients, supra note 86. The IRB reviewed the IND to ensure that (1) the risks of taking the
investigational drug are reasonable in light of the potential benefits and (2) the patient has been
adequately informed of these risks, such that their consent is valid. Id. Recently, however, the
FDA announced that it will only require one IRB member to review Expanded Access
requests. See Scott Gottlieb, Expanded Access: FDA Describes Efforts to Ease Application
Process, FDA VOICE (Oct. 3, 2017), https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2017/10/
expanded-access-fda-describes-efforts-to-ease-application-process/ [https://perma.cc/53MM4C4Z].
93. 21 C.F.R. § 312.300(b) (defining a serious disease or condition as “a disease or
condition associated with morbidity that has substantial impact on day-to-day functioning”).
94. Id. (defining an immediately life-threatening disease or condition as “a stage of disease
in which there is reasonable likelihood that death will occur within a matter of months or in
which premature death is likely without early treatment”).
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obtain the experimental drug.95 Moreover, the FDA must determine that the
experimental drug is sufficiently safe for the requesting patient to use.96 The
FDA must also conclude that providing the drug outside of a clinical trial
“will not interfere with the initiation, conduct, or completion of clinical
investigations that could support marketing approval.”97 While these
requirements are extensive, the FDA approves most Expanded Access
requests that it receives.98
However, FDA approval of an Expanded Access request does not
guarantee a patient access to an investigational drug; rather, access hinges on
the drug sponsor’s approval of the request and, sometimes, the patient’s
ability to afford the drug. Indeed, the drug sponsor must agree to provide the
patient with the investigational drug—and it is not uncommon for drug
sponsors to refuse to do so.99 Furthermore, if the drug sponsor agrees to
provide the investigational drug, it must either absorb the drug’s cost or ask
the patient to find a way to pay for his or her own treatment.100 Seeing as the
average price of an orphan drug is $111,820 per year,101 dispensing

95. See id. § 312.305(a)(1); Expanded Access: Information for Patients, supra note 86.
96. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(2) (“[The] FDA must determine that . . . [t]he potential
patient benefit justifies the potential risks of the treatment use and those potential risks are not
unreasonable in the context of the disease or condition to be treated.”). In other words, the
risk of taking the investigational drug cannot exceed the risk of leaving the disease untreated.
See Expanded Access: Information for Patients, supra note 86.
97. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(3).
98. Expanded Access: Information for Patients, supra note 86.
99. As Dr. Darshak M. Sanghavi explained:
[C]ompanies hesitate to do anything to jeopardize a product too soon. If they give
drugs away, a disastrous side effect or other poor outcome could spur bad publicity
and extra scrutiny from regulators. Even more important, if doctors simply let
people take untested medicines without going through all the clinical trials, drug
companies would most likely never get anyone to enroll in them, never get the data
on safety and efficacy for F.D.A. approval and never pass the gateway to big sales.
“Even if patients . . . are willing buyers,” writes George Annas, a Boston University
expert on medical law, “drug manufacturers are not willing sellers.”
Darshak M. Sanghavi, The Pills of Last Resort: How Dying Patients Get Access to
Experimental Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/
03/magazine/how-dying-patients-get-access-to-experimental-drugs.html?pagewanted=all
[https://perma.cc/VN73-7LPX].
100. See Expanded Access: Information for Patients, supra note 86 (“The drug company
may request authorization from FDA to charge [the patient] the . . . costs of making the drug
available . . . or it may elect to cover the cost.”). However, the FDA must authorize the
investigational drug’s sponsor to charge for the product. See Charging for Investigational
Drugs Under an IND—Questions and Answers, FDA 6 (June 2016),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidan
ces/UCM351264.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9H3-23CW]; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.8(a) (noting
that, if certain criteria are met, a drug sponsor may charge for a drug under an IND). The FDA
will authorize a drug sponsor to charge the patient for expanded use of its product when the
sponsor (1) reasonably assures the FDA that charging for the product will not interfere with
drug development and (2) demonstrates that the amount to be charged complies with 21 C.F.R.
§ 312.8(d). 21 C.F.R. § 312.8(a); see id. § 312.8(c)–(d) (describing the criteria for charging
for access to an investigational drug and what costs the drug sponsor may recover).
101. Sarah Jane Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, High Prices for Orphan Drugs Strain Families
and Insurers, NPR (Jan. 17, 2017, 1:36 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2017/01/17/509507035/high-prices-for-orphan-drugs-strain-families-and-insurers
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experimental drugs through the Expanded Access program necessarily
imposes a considerable financial burden on drug sponsors, patients, and,
occasionally, health insurers.
The FDA’s Expanded Access program has been increasingly criticized in
recent years.102 Even though the FDA approves virtually all of the Expanded
Access requests it receives,103 FDA critics argue that the complicated, timeconsuming request process deters patients and physicians from utilizing the
program to acquire investigational drugs.104 In response to mounting
criticism, the FDA overhauled its Expanded Access program in 2015 to
streamline the request process.
It published a new “relatively
straightforward” IND request form and launched a website designed to make
it easier for physicians to find information regarding investigational drugs.105
Still unsatisfied, FDA critics have been gaining traction with the passage
of “right-to-try” laws in at least thirty-eight states.106 These state laws “seek
to remove the FDA from the equation, allowing doctors, patients, and drug
makers to strike their own deals for drugs that have cleared the safety phase
of FDA testing.”107 By permitting patients to access investigational drugs
without FDA approval,108 the Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act resembles
these state laws.
In October 2017, the FDA announced several adjustments to the Expanded
Access program that will purportedly hasten the process of requesting
investigational drugs.109 Moreover, in November 2017, the FDA announced
an expansion of the “Expanded Access Navigator Tool” to include rare[https://perma.cc/FM7U-LFRB]. By contrast, the average annual price of a non-orphan drug
is $23,331. Id.
102. See Darrow et al., supra note 90 (noting that the Expanded Access program “has
become increasingly controversial”).
103. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Christina Corieri, Everyone Deserves the Right to Try: Empowering the
Terminally Ill to Take Control of Their Treatment, GOLDWATER INST. (Oct. 7, 2014),
http://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/everyone-deserves-right-try-empowering-terminally/
[https://perma.cc/5LR5-UQ9Y].
105. Alexander Gaffney, From 100 Hours to 1: FDA Dramatically Simplifies Its
Compassionate Use Process, REG. AFF. PROFESSIONALS SOC’Y (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2015/02/04/21243/From-100-Hours-to-1-FDADramatically-Simplifies-its-Compassionate-Use-Process/ [https://perma.cc/V2MW-SHPY].
106. Kimberly Leonard, Koch-Backed Group Urges Passage of ‘Right to Try’ Bill Allowing
Experimental Drugs for Terminal Patients, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 8, 2018, 9:31 AM),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/koch-backed-group-urges-passage-of-right-to-try-billallowing-experimental-drugs-for-terminal-patients/article/2645255 [https://perma.cc/53W543D3]; see also Trudy Lieberman, Opinion, Right-To-Try Drug Proposal Is a Solution for a
Non-Existent Problem, J.-ADVOC. (Sept. 12, 2017, 9:44 PM), http://www.journaladvocate.com/sterling-columnists/ci_31296225/right-try-drug-proposal-is-solution-nonexistent [https://perma.cc/3Q3G-FESL].
107. Tedeschi, supra note 87.
108. See S. 204, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017).
109. Gottlieb, supra note 92. Physicians are no longer required to seek approval of an IND
from an entire IRB; instead, physicians can acquire the approval of just one IRB member. Id.;
see also supra note 92. Moreover, drug companies no longer need to submit to the FDA data
regarding suspected adverse reactions to the drugs they provide through the Expanded Access
program. Gottlieb, supra note 92. Instead, they will need to submit such data “only if there is
evidence to suggest a causal relationship between the drug and the adverse event.” Id.

1904

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

disease patients.110 The tool will help rare-disease patients to find drug
sponsors that dispense drugs through the Expanded Access pathway.111
It is too early to tell whether these updates to the FDA’s Expanded Access
program will materially facilitate patient access to investigational drugs.
However, should Congress fail to enact the Trickett Wendler Right to Try
Act, critics of the program should take some solace in the fact that the FDA
seems to hear their complaints, as illustrated by its efforts to improve the
Expanded Access program.
II. UNCONTROLLED PATIENT EXPERIENCE DATA
AND UNFETTERED INVESTIGATIONAL DRUG ACCESS:
ARE WE HURTING PATIENTS OR HELPING THEM?
Having outlined the laws and regulations governing orphan-drug
development, approval, and access, this Part explores how the 21st Century
Cures Act and the Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act may change the
landscape of drug approvals for the benefit of rare-disease patients. Part II.A
discusses section 3001 of the 21st Century Cures Act and how patient
experience data—which, as defined, may be collected by any person, outside
of clinical trials—could alter the otherwise objective drug-approval process.
Part II.B examines the risks of granting patients access to investigational
drugs without FDA approval, as permitted by the Trickett Wendler Right to
Try Act.
A. The 21st Century Cures Act and Patient Experience Data
Congress passed the 21st Century Cures Act in December 2016.112 The
Act—which Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell described as “the
most important legislation” passed in 2016113—enjoyed bipartisan support
and passed both houses of Congress with overwhelming majorities.114
The rare-disease community has welcomed the passage of the 21st Century
Cures Act,115 which purports “[t]o accelerate the discovery, development,
110. Scott Gottlieb, FDA Widens Scope of Navigator—Information Tool for Expanded
Access, FDA VOICE (Nov. 2, 2017), https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2017/11/fdawidens-scope-of-navigator-information-tool-for-expanded-access/ [https://perma.cc/2UZTFM54].
111. See id. FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb reported that this resource will help raredisease patients access unapproved therapies. See id.
112. See generally 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016)
(codified in scattered sections of 21 and 42 U.S.C.); Sydney Lupkin & Steven Findlay,
Winners and Losers with the 21st Century Cures Bill, NPR (Dec. 2, 2016, 1:18 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/12/02/504139105/winners-and-losers-if21st-century-cures-bill-becomes-law [https://perma.cc/MCY9-74GJ].
113. Lupkin & Findlay, supra note 112.
114. Id. (noting that the 21st Century Cures Act passed the Senate by 94 to 5 votes); see
also Sheila Kaplan, Winners and Losers of the 21st Century Cures Act, STAT (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://www.statnews.com/2016/12/05/21st-century-cures-act-winners-losers/
[https://perma.cc/6PM3-B3SR] (noting that the 21st Century Cures Act passed the House by
392 to 26 votes).
115. NORD and other rare-disease patient advocacy groups lobbied heavily for the bill’s
passage. See Jennifer Huron, Senate Passes Landmark 21st Century Cures Act, NAT’L ORG.
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and delivery” of medical treatments.116 The Act contains several provisions
that may facilitate the development of orphan drugs. For example, it extends
the “Rare Pediatric Disease Priority Review Voucher Program” and
streamlines the review process for genetically targeted drugs and proteinvariant drugs for rare diseases.117 It also grants $4.8 billion in funding for
various NIH initiatives, which could spur innovation in the rare-disease
field.118 Additionally, section 3001 of the Act mandates that the FDA
publicly issue a “brief statement” regarding any patient experience data that
the Agency considers in approving a drug.119
Pursuant to the 21st Century Cures Act, patient experience data can be
collected outside of controlled clinical trials by individuals who are not
trained scientists.120 The Act provides that patient experience data is
“intended to provide information about the experience of patients with a
disease, or the impact a disease and management of the disease has on the
lives of patients or their caregivers.”121 Accordingly, by permitting the FDA
to consider patient experience data when approving drugs, section 3001
departs from the longstanding practice of approving drugs using evidence

RARE DISORDERS (Dec. 7, 2016), https://rarediseases.org/senate-passes-landmark-21stcentury-cures-act/ [https://perma.cc/7UQL-RL66]. The pharmaceutical industry also lobbied
heavily for the Act’s approval. See Trudy Lieberman, With Media Watchdogs on the Sidelines,
Pharma-Funded Advocacy Groups Pushed Cures to the Finish Line, HEALTH NEWS REV. (Dec.
6,
2016),
http://www.healthnewsreview.org/2016/12/with-media-watchdogs-sidelinedpharma-funded-advocacy-groups-pushed-cures-act-to-the-finish-line/
[https://perma.cc/NHS8-WD44].
116. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. Nopo. 114-255, pmbl., 130 Stat. 1033, 1033
(2016); Mike DeBonis, Congress Passes 21st Century Cures Act, Boosting Research and
Easing
Drug
Approvals,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
7,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/12/07/congress-passes-21stcentury-cures-act-boosting-research-and-easing-drug-approvals
[https://perma.cc/9N6BYBGJ].
117. See 21 U.S.C. § 360ff(b) (Supp. IV 2016); Huron, supra note 115.
118. See Huron, supra note 115.
119. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c(b). Additionally, the Act exempts the FDA from the
Paperwork Reduction Act when requesting information from patients, meaning that the FDA
will not have to seek Office of Management and Budget approval before requesting patient
experience data submissions from the public. 21st Century Cures Act: Key Provisions (Title
III—Development), COVINGTON 2
(Dec.
22,
2016),
https://www.cov.com//media/files/corporate/publications/2016/12/21st_century_cures_act_key_provisions_title_iii
_development.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z742-9JCA]; see 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c note
(Streamlining Patient Input). Furthermore, the Act requires the FDA to report and publish
online how it has used patient experience data in regulatory decisions before June 1, 2021,
with follow-up reports in 2026 and 2031. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 note (Report on Patient
Experience Drug Development). The FDA has begun implementing section 3001 by adding
a “Patient Experience Data” subsection to drug and biologic review documents. See
Implementation of the 21st Century Cures Act: Progress and the Path Forward for Medical
Innovation, FDA (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm5
87804.htm [https://perma.cc/AY62-ZAP7]. Reviewers of new drugs must “include a brief
statement regarding patient experience data and related information” included in new product
applications. Id.
120. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c(c) (describing patient experience data as “data . . .
collected by any persons”).
121. Id.
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from controlled clinical trials.122 Section 3001 thus raises many questions,
such as what controls the FDA will place on patient experience data
submissions and how much weight the FDA will give to patient experience
data in drug approvals.123
Some critics of the 21st Century Cures Act are concerned that patient
experience data may bias the otherwise objective, data-driven drug-approval
process.124 Others go further and postulate that considering patient
experience data in drug approvals is “incompatible” with the FDCA’s
substantial-evidence-of-effectiveness approval standard (the “substantial
evidence standard”).125
To be sure, the 21st Century Cures Act does not stipulate how much weight
the FDA should give patient experience data vis-à-vis clinical data in
approving drugs;126 and, with the Eteplirsen controversy looming fresh,127 it
is reasonable to be concerned that anecdotal stories could overpower clinical
data in the drug-approval process.
However, the 21st Century Cures Act does not provide that patient
experience data could replace data gathered from controlled clinical studies
in drug approvals.128 Rather, section 3001 broadly defines patient experience
data as information about a patient’s experience with a disease or condition,
not specifically with the drug being considered for approval.129 This
122. 21st Century Cures Act—Provisions to Promote Drug Development, supra note 28;
see supra notes 34–47 and accompanying text.
123. Indeed, it may be years before these questions are answered because the FDA is not
required to issue final guidance on how it shall implement section 3001 of the 21st Century
Cures Act until 2020. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c note (Patient-Focused Drug Development
Guidance). In May 2017, the FDA released a plan for issuing this guidance. Plan for Issuance
of Patient-Focused Drug Development Guidance, FDA 4–7 (May 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/UCM5636
18.pdf [https://perma.cc/5E8E-2J8A]. The guidance drafting process began on December 18,
2017, when the FDA held a public workshop to discuss appropriate methodological
approaches for collecting patient experience data for use in regulatory decision-making. See
Notice of Request for Comments on Patient-Focused Drug Development, 82 Fed. Reg. 207,
49,838–39 (Oct. 27, 2017). The FDA will hold another public workshop on March 19, 2018,
to discuss how anyone seeking to submit draft guidance to the FDA regarding patient
experience data may do so. Notice of Request for Comments on Patient-Focused Drug
Development, 82 Fed. Reg. 239, 58,816 (Dec. 14, 2017).
124. See, e.g., Farrah R. Raja, Evidentiary Standards for Drug Approvals in the 21st
Century Cures Act: A Continued Trend Towards Valuing Access over Safety for
Pharmaceutical Drugs, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 409, 428 (2017) (criticizing the 21st Century
Cures Act for endangering patients by reducing the evidentiary standards of drug approval);
see also Alan Levinovitz, The FDA Should Approve Drugs Based on Evidence, Not Emotions,
SLATE (Dec. 13, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_
examiner/2016/12/the_21st_century_cares_act_could_be_dangerous_for_everyone.html
[https://perma.cc/J4W9-6J9B] (describing the 21st Century Cures Act as permitting
“medication approval driven by outrage and desperation, rather than evidence and reason”).
125. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 15, at 44849.
126. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c(b).
127. See supra notes 9–19 and accompanying text.
128. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c(b).
129. Id. § 360bbb-8c(c). To be sure, section 3001 provides that patient experience data
include data that concern “the impact of . . . a related therapy[] on patients’ lives” and “patient
preferences with respect to treatment of such disease or condition.” Id. However, Congress’s
use of the word “includes,” as well as its failure to specifically mention patient experience
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expansive definition, along with the FDCA requirement that the FDA refuse
to approve drugs that lack substantial evidence of safety and efficacy,130
suggest that Congress did not intend for patient experience data to replace
clinical data in drug approvals.131
Indeed, “[e]ach time Congress has amended the [FDCA] to provide [the]
FDA with new tools to get drugs to patients faster it has also tacked on a ‘rule
of construction’ that preserves the substantial evidence standard.”132 No such
rule, however, accompanies section 3001 of the 21st Century Cures Act.133
The absence of such a rule of construction further indicates that Congress did
not intend for patient experience data to replace clinical data in drug
approvals, or otherwise jeopardize the substantial evidence standard for drug
approval. Accordingly, while the effects of patient experience data on the
drug-approval process remain to be seen,134 section 3001, as written, does
not necessarily threaten patient safety.
In fact, patient experience data could contribute to the drug-approval
process by providing what clinical data cannot: the context to understand the
potential impact of a new drug on a patient’s life.135 Patient experience data
could assist the FDA in answering several questions, such as, how
burdensome is a given disease on patients’, and their caregivers’, day-to-day
lives? What range of symptoms do patients with a given disease typically
suffer? How do patients currently manage these symptoms? Armed with
answers to these and other questions, the FDA will be better equipped to
identify whether new drugs meet patient needs and, in so doing, will advance
its general mission of serving the public health.136
with the drug being approved, further indicate that Congress did not intend for patient
experience data to replace clinical data in drug approvals. See id.
130. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012) (requiring the FDA to refuse an NDA if the NDA
“do[es] not include adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or
not such drug is safe for use under the [intended] conditions,” if there is “insufficient
information to determine whether such drug is safe for use,” or if there is “a lack of substantial
evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports . . . to have”).
131. See Step 3: Clinical Research, supra note 36 (noting that not even preclinical research
can be substituted for clinical research or “studies of ways the drug will interact with the
human body”). That said, anecdotal patient stories played a role in Eteplirsen’s approval. See
supra notes 9–19 and accompanying text. Indeed, some point to Eteplirsen’s approval to argue
that the 21st Century Cures Act could encourage the FDA to rely on patient experience data
in drug approvals at the expense of patient safety. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 15, at 448–
49. However, this critique overlooks both the value of patient experience data and the
complications of developing drugs for rare diseases. See supra Part I.B.
132. Edwards, supra note 15, at 447.
133. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c.
134. The FDA has not yet issued guidance implementing this provision. See 21st Century
Cures Act Deliverables, FDA (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/Regulatory
Information/LawsEnforcedbyFDA/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/21stCenturyCures
Act/ucm562475.htm [https://perma.cc/XFH9-8W2M]. For a discussion of the FDA’s plan for
issuing this guidance, see supra note 123.
135. See What Is Patient Experience?, AGENCY HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY (Oct. 2016),
https://www.ahrq.gov/cahps/about-cahps/patient-experience/index.html
[https://perma.cc/
54D8-B4XZ].
136. See Regulatory Radar: 21st Century Cures Act, Patient-Focused Drug Development,
NSF (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.nsf.org/newsroom/regulatory-radar-21st-century-cures-actpatient-focused-drug-development [https://perma.cc/825M-WMYT].
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Moreover, patient experience data may be especially helpful in orphandrug approvals.137 While laws like the ODA have helped to increase the
number of orphan drugs on the U.S. market,138 the fact that most rare diseases
lack an approved therapy139 suggests that the drug-regulation system is
inadequate for the needs of rare-disease patients.140 Certainly, there are many
difficulties surrounding orphan-drug development;141 however, the difficulty
most pertinent to patient experience data is the struggle drug developers face
in identifying appropriate clinical endpoints to measure the efficacy of a drug
in treating a given disease142 due to limited research into rare diseases.143
Patient experience data could thus help drug developers and the FDA
measure the clinical efficacy of rare-disease drugs because patients, who live
daily with their diseases, are well situated to identify the most life-altering
aspects of their diseases.144 Additionally, the systematic collection of patient
experience data may help future drug developers, doctors, and patients to
better understand the natural histories of rare diseases.145 Equipped with
more information regarding the progression of different rare diseases, drug
developers will be able to develop more effective therapies,146 doctors will
137. See Stephen Smith, Rare Disease Patient Voices Bring Change to the Clinical Trials
Process, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2014, 10:51 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/medidata/
2014/09/25/rare-disease-patient-voices-bring-change-to-the-clinical-trialsprocess/#38edf6994a11 [https://perma.cc/M98Z-K2HT].
138. Recall that over 600 orphan drugs have been approved since the passage of the ODA.
See Elgin et al., supra note 2; see also supra text accompanying note 65.
139. See Ascher et al., supra note 51.
140. See COMM. ON ACCELERATING RARE DISEASES RESEARCH & ORPHAN PROD. DEV.,
RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN PRODUCTS: ACCELERATING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 105
(Marilyn J. Field & Thomas F. Boat eds., 2010) (“[R]eview of drugs and biologics intended
for small populations needs special consideration and expertise related to appropriate . . .
analytic methods.”).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 73–75 for a discussion of other difficulties
surrounding orphan-drug development.
142. See Erika F. Augustine et al., Clinical Trials in Rare Disease: Challenges and
Opportunities, 28 J. CHILD NEUROLOGY 1142, 1146 (2013).
143. See id.; see also Rare Diseases: Common Issues in Drug Development Draft
Guidance, FDA 3 (2015), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM458485.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9ZBC-7XEN]
(“Because of the small numbers of patients affected, and with clinical experience dispersed
among a small number of clinical referral centers, the natural history of rare diseases is often
poorly described.”).
144. Indeed, in its “Rare Diseases: Common Issues in Drug Development” draft guidance,
the FDA underscored “the need for [drug] sponsors to gain greater biological, clinical, and
epidemiological knowledge about the specific rare diseases under investigation.” Michael F.
Murphy, Rare Diseases: Meeting the Unique Challenges of Orphan Drug Development,
APPLIED CLINICAL TRIALS (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.appliedclinicaltrialsonline.com/rarediseases-meeting-unique-challenges-orphan-drug-development?pageID=2
[https://perma.cc/ND43-RNXM]; see also Rare Diseases: Common Issues in Drug
Development Draft Guidance, supra note 143.
145. A disease’s natural history “refers to the progression of a disease process in an
individual over time, in the absence of treatment.” Section 9: Natural History and Spectrum
of Disease, CDC (May 18, 2012), https://www.cdc.gov/ophss/csels/dsepd/ss1978/
lesson1/section9.html [https://perma.cc/6UEW-GMSM].
146. Id. To elaborate:
A natural history study can provide critical information to guide every stage of drug
development from drug discovery to determining effectiveness and safety of the
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be able to more easily diagnose patients with rare diseases,147 and,
accordingly, patients will be able to start treating their rare diseases earlier.
B. The Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act:
Accessing Investigational Drugs Without FDA Approval
The Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act passed the Senate unanimously in
August 2017 and is currently pending House approval.148 If it becomes law,
this Act will permit patients with “life-threatening” illnesses to access
investigational drugs without FDA approval.149
Specifically, the Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act amends the FDCA to
permit patients with life-threatening illnesses to request investigational drugs
from drug sponsors if the drug has already undergone preliminary testing in
a Phase I trial, if the patient has exhausted available therapies, and if the
patient is unable to join any ongoing clinical trials.150 Additionally, a
physician must approve the patient’s use of the drug and the patient must
provide the physician with “written informed consent regarding” the drug.151
The Act further provides that the FDA shall not use “clinical outcomes”
associated with the use of an experimental drug accessed through the “Right
to Try” pathway “to delay or adversely affect the review or approval” of the

drug in treating a disease. Knowledge about the disease’s natural history can inform
important aspects of drug development including:
Defining the disease population, including a description of the full range of
disease manifestations and identification of important disease subtypes[;]
Understanding and implementation of critical elements in clinical study design,
such as study duration and choice of subpopulations[;]
Developing and selecting outcome measures that are more specific or sensitive
to changes in the manifestations of the disease or more quickly demonstrate
safety or efficacy than existing measures[;]
Developing new or optimized biomarkers that may provide proof-of-concept
(POC) information, guide dose selection, allow early recognition of safety
concerns, or provide supportive evidence of efficacy. In some cases, biomarkers
can be used for surrogate endpoints.
Rare Diseases: Common Issues in Drug Development Draft Guidance, supra note 143; see
also Greg Breining, Rare Diseases Difficult to Diagnose, Cures Hard to Come By,
AAMCNEWS (Apr. 11, 2017), https://news.aamc.org/research/article/rare-diseases-difficultdiagnose-cures-hard-come/ [https://perma.cc/KX5B-ZYJ6] (quoting medical student and rare
disease patient David Fajgenbaum as claiming that “[t]he number one reason [for the limited
availability of rare disease treatments] is that pathogenesis and the underlying biology of many
of these rare diseases is very poorly understood” and that “[i]f you don’t understand the
biology of a disease, then it’s very difficult to treat it”).
147. See Breining, supra note 146. Doctors struggle to diagnose patients with rare diseases
because they infrequently encounter rare diseases and because the greater medical community
has limited knowledge of many rare diseases. See id. It thus follows that greater knowledge
of rare diseases will facilitate diagnoses.
148. See S. 204, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017); Karlin-Smith & Kim, supra note 29.
149. See S. 204 § 2(a).
150. See id.; see also Karlin-Smith & Kim, supra note 29. To be clear, if it becomes law,
the Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act would not replace the FDA’s Expanded Access program
but would provide an alternative pathway for accessing investigational drugs outside of
clinical trials. S. 204 § 3(1)–(4).
151. S. 204 § 2(a).
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drug.152 The Act also requires all drug sponsors to submit an annual report
to the FDA detailing when they have provided experimental drugs through
the Right to Try pathway.153 Moreover, the Act specifies that neither the
drug’s sponsor, prescriber, nor another “individual entity” shall be liable for
properly using the Right to Try pathway.154 Accordingly, if the Trickett
Wendler Right to Try Act becomes law,155 FDA critics will finally get a
system for accessing investigational drugs that bypasses the FDA.156
The Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act would also permit doctors to play
a lesser role in the investigational drug-access process than they do in the
Expanded Access program.157 Indeed, doctors would only be required to
certify that a patient had exhausted all FDA-approved therapies for treating
his or her illness for that patient to be eligible to receive an experimental
therapy.158 It thus follows that if the time-consuming Expanded Access
program requirements are indeed a barrier to patients seeking investigational
drugs, the passage of the Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act could result in
increased access to and use of investigational drugs.
However, some critics claim that the bill, if passed, would not actually help
patients to access investigational therapies.159 These critics point to the
mechanics of the Expanded Access program: specifically, that the FDA
already approves 99 percent of the Expanded Access requests it receives (in
under four days)160 and that the bill does not eliminate the need for drug
sponsors to consent to providing patients with investigational drugs outside
of clinical trials.161
As previously discussed, this consent can be hard come by:162 drug
sponsors are often reluctant to dispense drugs through the Expanded Access
program because an adverse outcome could “spur bad publicity and extra
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. See id. § 2(b).
155. President Trump would likely sign off on a federal right-to-try bill given the support
he has voiced for the right-to-try movement. See Michael Mezher, Trump Signals Support for
‘Right-to-Try’ Movement, REG. AFF. PROFESSIONALS SOC’Y (Feb. 2, 2017),
http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2017/02/02/26759/Trump-Signals-Support-forRight-to-Try-Movement/ [https://perma.cc/3SLE-D8ZK].
156. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
157. To compare, under the FDA’s Expanded Access program, doctors must sponsor a
patient’s use of an investigational drug by filing an IND application and must seek to have the
IND approved by at least one member of an IRB. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying
text.
158. See S. 204 § 2(a).
159. See, e.g., Lieberman, supra note 106 (arguing that FDA involvement in the Expanded
Access program protects patients and that drug companies, not the FDA, hinder patient access
to investigational drugs).
160. See id.; see also Alison Bateman-House et al., ‘Right to Try’ Won’t Give Patients
Access to Experimental Drugs. Here’s What Will., HEALTH AFF. (May 3, 2017),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170503.059926/full/
[https://perma.cc/4SNG-NRRC].
161. See Lieberman, supra note 106 (emphasizing that drug companies must agree to
provide patients with access to investigational drugs).
162. See Sanghavi, supra note 99 (“Even if patients . . . are willing buyers, . . . drug
manufacturers are not willing sellers.”).
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scrutiny from regulators.”163 Additionally, if more patients access
investigational drugs outside of clinical trials, drug companies would likely
struggle to meet enrollment targets for clinical trials and thus struggle to
collect the safety and efficacy data required to secure FDA approval.164
Furthermore, given the expense of drug development, drug sponsors may
lack adequate supplies to freely dispense investigational drugs outside of
clinical trials.165 There is also the practical strain of providing drugs outside
of those trials: drug sponsors—particularly small businesses—are forced to
handle “constant [investigational drug] requests that they lack the time or the
resources to evaluate properly.”166 Thus, providing patients access to
investigational drugs through the Expanded Access program burdens drug
manufacturers in many different ways.
That said, as passed by the Senate, the Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act
provides that the FDA cannot use adverse outcomes from the use of an
investigational drug through the Right to Try pathway “to delay or adversely
affect the review or approval” of a drug.167 Accordingly, if this provision is
enacted, it may assuage at least some drug sponsor concerns about providing
patients with investigational drugs and, therefore, help patients with lifethreatening illnesses to access treatments by incentivizing drug sponsors to
dispense experimental therapies. However, drug sponsors would still need
to devote inventory and personnel resources to manage Right to Try, as well
as Expanded Access, requests.
Burdens on the pharmaceutical industry aside, other critics of the Trickett
Wendler Right to Try Act fear that the law, if passed, would weaken
important regulatory safeguards that protect patients by exposing them to
products that have not been proven to be safe, or even effective.168 For
example, John Osborn and David Beier point to solanezumab, an Eli Lilly
drug, to argue that allowing patients unregulated access to investigational
drugs is risky: in early clinical studies, solanezumab appeared to effectively
treat Alzheimer’s disease, but a Phase III trial proved it to be totally
ineffective.169 Certainly, patients with life-threatening diseases would not

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Amy Scharf & Elizabeth Dzeng, ‘I’m Willing to Try Anything’: Compassionate Use
Access to Experimental Drugs and the Misguided Mission of Right-to-Try Laws, HEALTH AFF.
(Mar. 27, 2017), http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170327.059378/full/#s33
[https://perma.cc/78LU-7ABQ].
166. Lawrence M. Fisher, The Ethics of Compassionate Care, BRIEFINGS, Fall 2015, at 57,
59.
167. S. 204, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017).
168. See, e.g., The Cruel Sham That Is “Right-to-Try” Is One Step Closer to Being Federal
Law, RESPECTFUL INSOLENCE (Aug. 4, 2017), https://respectfulinsolence.com/2017/08/04/thecruel-sham-that-is-right-to-try-is-that-much-closer-to-being-law/
[https://perma.cc/8VQJYZ73].
169. John Osborn & David Beier, ‘Right to Try’ Unapproved Medicines: Should Efficacy
Be Optional?, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2017, 9:26 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnosborn/
2017/10/07/right-to-try-unapproved-medicines-should-efficacy-be-optional/#190e6a36506d
[https://perma.cc/Z3NZ-CFTR].
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benefit from facilitated access to medications that do not work or, worse, that
are unsafe.
Osborn and Beier’s argument, however, goes to the philosophic core of the
greater right-to-try movement170: whether patients with life-threatening
illnesses who have exhausted all available approved therapies should be able
to try investigational drugs without FDA permission.171 Right-to-try
proponents argue that patients are well informed about their illnesses and,
therefore, that a paternalistic approach to experimental drug access is not
required to protect patient welfare.172 Others argue that right-to-try
legislation offers a lifeline to patients with life-threatening illnesses who
cannot participate in clinical trials.173 However, some argue that right-to-try
laws prey on the vulnerabilities of the life-threateningly ill who, desperate to
live, do not fully appreciate the risks of taking a drug that has only undergone
a Phase I clinical trial and whose health will thus be seriously endangered.174
This ethical question is difficult to resolve, particularly in light of the D.C.
Circuit’s controversial 2007 ruling that terminally ill patients have no
fundamental right to access investigational drugs.175
III. BALANCING PATIENT PARTICIPATION WITH SAFETY:
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE 21ST CENTURY CURES ACT
AND AMENDING THE TRICKETT WENDLER RIGHT TO TRY ACT
This Part suggests how the FDA should implement section 3001 of the 21st
Century Cures Act and how the House of Representatives should amend the
Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act. Considering the potential for both pieces
of legislation to help rare-disease patients access drugs,176 as well as the risks
of allowing patients to participate in the drug-approval and access

170. Recall that, as of January 2018, at least thirty-eight states have passed right-to-try
laws. See Leonard, supra note 106.
171. See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text.
172. See generally Carrie Feibel, Patients Demand the Right to Try Experimental Drugs,
but Costs Can Be Steep, NPR (Mar. 3, 2017, 2:17 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2017/03/03/517796956/patients-demand-the-right-to-try-experimental-drugs-but-costscan-be-steep [https://perma.cc/4V9W-UE3J] (quoting right-to-try advocate Lina Clark as
saying, on behalf of the patient community,“[w]e are smart, we’re informed, we feel it is our
right to try some of these therapies, because we’re going to die anyway”).
173. See Corieri, supra note 104.
174. See Osborn & Beier, supra note 169. As they elaborate,
Even leading cancer care advocates are squeamish about loosening the current
expanded access standards without adding safeguards. Dr. Ellen [Sigal], Chair of
the Friends of Cancer Research, recalled that her late sister, who had exhausted all
treatment options at the time, decided to try an experimental bone marrow transplant
procedure; tragically, this resulted in her swift death and studies later concluded that
the procedure was less efficacious and more risky than previously thought.
Id.
175. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d
695, 711–12 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also D.C. Circuit Court Rules in Abigail Alliance Case;
Affirms District Court Ruling That There Is No Fundamental Right of Access to Experimental
Drugs
for
the
Terminally
Ill,
FDA
L.
BLOG
(Aug.
7,
2007),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/2007/08/dc-circuit-cour/ [https://perma.cc/JQA3-49CR].
176. See supra notes 135–47, 172–73.
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processes,177 these suggestions strive to balance patient safety with easier
access to medical treatments.
Specifically, Part III.A argues that the FDA must scrutinize the source of
patient experience data submissions to ensure that parties who are financially
interested in a drug’s approval do not bias the drug-approval process. Part
III.A then proposes that the FDA create a standardized questionnaire for
patient experience data submissions to ensure that the data is as objective as
possible. Next, Part III.B contends that if seriously ill patients are to have
increased access to experimental therapies, then the House must amend the
Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act to incentivize drug sponsors to provide
drugs through the Right to Try pathway. Part III.B further asserts that the
House must account for the safety risks of increased access to experimental
drugs by mandating patient counseling, requiring that Right to Try requests
be made anonymously, and encouraging patient participation in clinical
trials.
A. The FDA Should Control the Solicitation
and Submission of Patient Experience Data
to Ensure the Process Remains Objective
The 21st Century Cures Act’s patient experience data provisions could
benefit rare-disease patients in several ways. If the FDA frequently considers
patient experience data in approving drugs, this will likely incentivize drug
manufacturers, patient advocacy organizations (PAO), and other entities to
collect patient experience data for FDA use in drug approvals.178 Moreover,
scientific researchers will be able to harness this data to study the natural
histories of rare diseases, most of which are poorly understood.179
Eventually, a better understanding of rare diseases will enable doctors to
diagnose patients with rare diseases more easily and enable drug makers to
develop products that better target the causes and symptoms of rare
diseases.180 Certainly, these are promising prospects for rare-disease
patients. That said, the 21st Century Cures Act grants the FDA broad leeway
to implement section 3001.181 Therefore, the FDA must carefully implement
this section to avoid compromising patient safety.
First, and most generally, the 21st Century Cures Act broadly defines
patient experience data and does not specify how much weight the FDA
177. See supra notes 124–27, 174–75.
178. In addition to drug manufacturers and PAOs, the 21st Century Cures Act explicitly
permits disease-research foundations, medical researchers, patients, parents, and caregivers to
collect patient experience data for submission to the FDA. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c(c)
(Supp. IV 2016). Most rare diseases lack an approved therapy. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text. It therefore seems logical that patient advocacy organizations and other
entities interested in rare diseases would want to help get new treatments on the market.
179. See supra notes 142–47; see also Rare Diseases: Common Issues in Drug
Development Draft Guidance, supra note 143 (“[T]he natural history of rare diseases is often
poorly described.”).
180. See supra Part I.B.1.
181. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c note (Patient-Focused Drug Development Guidance);
supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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should give this data vis-à-vis clinical data.182 To ensure that the FDA only
approves drugs with substantial evidence of safety and effectiveness, and to
quell fears of unsafe or ineffective drugs being approved, the FDA should be
explicit in its guidance that patient experience data cannot and will not
replace clinical data in the drug-approval process.183
More specifically, the 21st Century Cures Act does not instruct how to
ensure that patient experience data—permissibly collected by any person,
outside of a controlled clinical setting—is reliable.184 To avoid biasing the
otherwise objective drug-approval process, the FDA should carefully control
the patient experience data submission process by scrutinizing the source of
all submissions.
Of particular concern is data collected by drug
manufacturers, PAOs, disease research foundations, and researchers
(“interested parties”) because these entities are inclined to be financially
interested in a drug’s approval. Less likely to be financially interested are
individual patients, family members, or caregivers (“disinterested parties”).
Being in the business of making drugs for sale, drug manufacturers are
inherently financially interested in a drug’s approval. Additionally, PAOs
are commonly funded by pharmaceutical companies,185 and some disease
research foundations engage in so-called “venture philanthropy” by investing
large sums in pharmaceutical companies.186 Indeed, researchers could also
be financially interested in a drug’s approval since the 21st Century Cures
Act does not stipulate that researchers must be unaffiliated with a drug
sponsor to collect patient experience data for FDA use.187
Accordingly, the FDA should develop a hierarchical system for reviewing
patient experience data submissions, in which the data’s source determines
the amount of authority accorded to it in the drug-approval process. The
greater the chance that the collector is financially interested in the drug’s
approval, the less weight the data should be accorded in deciding whether a
drug should be approved. However, the FDA should allow collectors to
182. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c; id. § 360bbb-8c note (Patient-Focused Drug Development
Guidance); see also supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.
183. The FDA must issue final guidance on how it shall implement section 3001 by 2020.
See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c note (Patient-Focused Drug Development Guidance); see also
supra note 123 and accompanying text.
184. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c; id. § 360bbb-8c note (Patient-Focused Drug Development
Guidance); see also supra note 120 and accompanying text. Instead, the FDA must issue
guidance concerning, among other topics, appropriate methods of collecting and submitting
patient experience data. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c note (Patient-Focused Drug Development
Guidance).
185. It is estimated that 83 percent of the largest PAOs in the United States accept
contributions from the pharmaceutical industry and that one in five of these PAOs has accepted
over $1 million from pharmaceutical company donors. Emily Kopp & Kaiser Health News,
Groups That Represent Patients Are Ranking in Donations from Big Pharma, TIME (Mar. 2,
2017),
http://time.com/money/4688501/patient-advocacy-groups-donations-from-pharma/
[https://perma.cc/GR42-7JWF].
186. For example, the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation used its funds to invest in Vertex
Pharmaceuticals in 2015. Llewellyn Hinkes-Jones, Stop Subsidizing Big Pharma, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan.
5,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/opinion/stop-subsidizing-bigpharma.html [https://perma.cc/B6QC-ZE85].
187. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c(c).
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overcome the presumption of bias through disclosure: if the collector can
show that it has no financial interest in the drug’s approval and that it has not
received funding or payment from the drug’s sponsor, its data should be
accorded as much weight as data collected by disinterested parties.
Financial interest in a drug’s approval is not the only factor that could
unduly bias a patient experience data submission. Indeed, if a submission
included personal information about a patient—such as his or her physical
appearance, age, income, or marital or family status—this information could
potentially inspire sympathy in FDA reviewers and thus bias the FDA in
favor of approving a drug.188 The FDA should therefore require data to be
submitted anonymously—in other words, without clinically irrelevant
information regarding a patient or group of patients. This would allow the
FDA to objectively determine how effective a drug is at treating the most
life-altering aspects of a given disease or condition.
The FDA must also ensure that all patient experience data submissions are
objectively accurate. To do so, the FDA should compare all patient
experience data to data collected through its Patient-Focused Drug
Development meetings,189 provided that such data exists for the disease that
a given drug is intended to treat.190 This comparison would function as a
check on patient experience data to ensure that the FDA relies on objectively
accurate, minimally biased information.
Moreover, the 21st Century Cures Act leaves the FDA to specify how to
collect patient experience data for consideration in regulatory decisionmaking.191 If the FDA does not strictly stipulate appropriate collection
methods for patient experience data, collectors could manipulate patient
experience data to favor drug approval. For example, if a drug being
considered for approval treats symptom X of disease Y, a drug manufacturer
could solicit targeted feedback from disease Y patients regarding symptom
X to support the drug’s approval. The drug manufacturer could thus present
the FDA with a skewed perspective of disease Y, which might obscure the
FDA’s understanding of disease Y and, thus, its decision to approve the drug.
The FDA should, therefore, develop a series of approved questions for the
interested parties to use in soliciting patient experience data, and for
disinterested parties to answer in making individual submissions.
Furthermore, the FDA should refuse to accept patient experience data that
does not conform to these approved questions. Such questions could include,
“In your opinion, what are the most debilitating symptoms of [given
188. For a related discussion on how personal information can bias a drug sponsor’s
decision to provide a patient with an investigational drug, see infra notes 214–15.
189. See Zachary Brennan, Califf: Patient Preferences Too Often Overlooked in Medical
Product Development, Approvals, REG. AFF. PROFESSIONALS SOC’Y (Nov. 19, 2017),
http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2015/11/19/23645/Califf-Patient-PreferencesToo-Often-Overlooked-in-Medical-Product-Development-Approvals/
[https://perma.cc/HU7H-WVTX].
190. See id.
191. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c note (Patient-Focused Drug Development Guidance).
Rather, the FDA must issue guidance concerning appropriate methods for collecting patient
experience data. See id.; see also supra note 123.
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disease]?” and “How burdensome is [given disease’s] current treatment
regime on a patient’s [or your] day-to-day life?” Standardizing the format in
which patient experience data is submitted to the FDA will help the FDA to
minimize opportunities for submitters to manipulate patient experience data
and thus reduce the likelihood of unreliable data biasing the drug-approval
process. By collecting minimally biased patient experience data, the FDA
will help build the natural histories of all diseases, which, as previously
discussed, will especially benefit rare-disease patients.192
B. The House of Representatives Should Amend the Trickett Wendler
Right to Try Act to Facilitate Access to Investigational Drugs
and Maintain Patient Safety
The unmet needs of rare-disease patients are profound.193 While patient
experience data as collected and reviewed in the manner detailed above194
will benefit rare-disease patients, these benefits will not be immediately
realized. Accumulating patient experience data requires time, and drug
makers will need even more time to harness this data to develop new drugs.
By facilitating access to experimental drugs, however, the Trickett Wendler
Right to Try Act could help some rare-disease patients to access treatments
in the meantime. Accordingly, the House of Representatives should pass the
Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act, amended as described below, to protect
the well-beings of patients and drug makers alike.
One shortcoming of the Expanded Access program is that drug makers
often resist supplying patients with investigational drugs.195 However,
sections 2(a) and 2(b)(1)(A) of the Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act may
incentivize drug makers to dispense drugs through the Right to Try pathway
and thus facilitate patient access to investigational medicines.196
Accordingly, to materially facilitate patient access to investigational drugs,
the House of Representatives must preserve these provisions when amending
the Act.
Section 2(a) provides that the outcome of a patient’s use of an
investigational drug shall not be used by federal agencies in the drugapproval process.197 Section 2(b)(1)(A) provides that drug makers will not
be liable for providing a patient with a drug through the Right to Try pathway
(i.e., without FDA approval).198 If these provisions become law, the FDA
will be unable to prosecute, or to unduly scrutinize in the approval process,
drug makers for dispensing unapproved drugs through the Right to Try
pathway. Minimizing the legal and regulatory risks of using the Right to Try
192. See supra text accompanying notes 145–47.
193. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
194. See supra Part III.A.
195. See Sanghavi, supra note 99.
196. See infra notes 197–98 and accompanying text.
197. See S. 204, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017). One concern of drug sponsors regarding the
Expanded Access program is that adverse outcomes of investigational drug use could be used
by the FDA in deciding whether to approve the drug, therefore jeopardizing the chances of the
drug’s approval. See Sanghavi, supra note 99.
198. See S. 204 § 2(b)(1)(A).
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pathway will likely incentivize drug makers to supply patients with
investigational drugs.
Another shortcoming of the Expanded Access program is that either drug
sponsors or patients must pay for investigational drugs,199 which are typically
expensive.200 As passed by the Senate, the Trickett Wendler Right to Try
Act does not address the monetary costs of providing patients with
investigational drugs.201 Since drug sponsors are generally better positioned
to absorb the high costs of drugs than individual patients,202 the House of
Representatives should amend the Act to permit drug makers to receive a
modest reduction in the cost of the investigational drug’s ultimate NDA. This
reduction should be proportional to the number of patients provided with the
drug over the course of drug development. Reducing the overall cost of drug
approval would further incentivize drug companies to provide drugs through
the Right to Try pathway, thereby increasing access to potentially life-saving
experimental treatments for seriously ill patients.
While incentivizing drug sponsors to provide patients with investigational
drugs is key to facilitating access to investigational drugs, these incentives
must be balanced with safety precautions. Indeed, most investigational drugs
prove either unsafe or ineffective in clinical testing.203 The Trickett Wendler
Right to Try Act overlooks this reality by failing to define what constitutes
adequate informed consent in the specific context of accessing
investigational therapies without FDA consent.204
To ensure that patients fully understand the risks of taking investigational
drugs—specifically, that investigational drugs are unlikely to cure or improve
199. See Expanded Access: Information for Patients, supra note 86. While some insurers
will cover the cost of investigational therapies, this is not always the case. See id. (reminding
patients that “most insurance companies will not pay for access to an investigational drug”).
Accordingly, this Note assumes that if the drug sponsor will not pay for the drug, the patient
will have to bear the cost of the investigational therapy.
200. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 101 (reporting that the average price of an orphan
drug is $111,820 per year).
201. See S. 204.
202. While health insurance companies may also be able to afford the costs of
investigational therapies, compelling them to pay for experimental drugs would not incentivize
drug makers to develop drugs to the same extent that reducing the cost of a drug’s NDA would,
and it could even cause insurance premiums to rise, which certainly would not help patients.
See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 101.
203. See Transcript of Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Health of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Examining Patient Access to Investigational Drugs 127
(Oct. 3, 2017) (unpublished transcript) (statement of Dr. Ellen V. Sigal, Chair & Founder,
Friends of Cancer Research); The Cruel Sham That Is “Right-to-Try” Is One Step Closer to
Being Federal Law, supra note 168.
204. See S. 204 § 2(a). Rather, the Act blankly requires that patients give physicians
“written informed consent regarding the eligible investigational drug.” Id. This contrasts
drastically with the requirements of the Expanded Access program, in which the FDA
considers whether the risk of a patient taking the investigational drug exceeds the risk of
leaving the patient’s disease untreated, and at least one member of an IRB decides whether the
risks of a patient taking the drug outweigh the potential benefits of taking the drug, and
whether the patient’s informed consent is reasonable in light of these risks. See supra Part I.C.
Since Senate Bill 204 does not require FDA or IRB approval for a patient to access an
investigational drug, there is currently no guarantee that a patient’s informed consent to using
an inherently risky investigational drug is reasonable.
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disease symptoms, and may seriously harm patients—the House of
Representatives should define what constitutes adequate informed consent in
the Right to Try context.205 Because most patients are not trained to interpret
scientific data, the House should mandate that the patient’s physician counsel
the patient (in terms the patient is likely to understand) on the investigational
drug’s clinical trial results, the risks and benefits of the drug treatment for
that particular patient, as well as the general risks of taking experimental
drugs.206 Such counseling will help patients to make informed decisions
regarding their treatment options and will thus promote patient safety.
Additionally, given the concerns about the time it takes for patients to access
investigational drugs,207 lawmakers should require that patient counseling
occur within seventy-two hours of a pharmaceutical company agreeing to
dispense an investigational drug to a patient.
The informed-consent measures described above will certainly burden
doctors. However, this burden must fall somewhere, because ensuring
patients are adequately informed is essential to preserving their safety in the
wake of facilitated access to investigational drugs.208 As noted previously,
most patients are not trained to interpret scientific data and may struggle to
properly measure the risks and benefits of taking an experimental therapy.209
Moreover, considering that the Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act applies
only to patients with life-threatening illnesses, a patient’s judgment in
deciding whether to try an investigational therapy could be clouded by
desperation to live.210
Furthermore, drug makers make drugs for profit. Having to devote
resources to counseling patients, on top of having to manage Right to Try
205. Testifying before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on right-to-try
legislation, Dr. Sigal argued that informed consent is vital to preserve patient safety:
[P]rovisions for informed consent are essential.
A significant majority of early-phase drugs are dangerous and ultimately prove
ineffective with upwards of 90 percent never being brought to the market.
....
Patients petitioning for expanded access deserve accurate information about
whether the potential benefits outweigh the risks. This is highly personal
calculus . . . .
....
. . . [W]e must not subject patients to false hope or unacceptable side effects.
Transcript of Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Health of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, supra note 203, at 127–28.
206. Some right-to-try critics argue that, without FDA oversight, doctors could coerce lifethreateningly ill patients into taking experimental drugs. See, e.g., Feibel, supra note 172
(quoting Dr. R. Adams Dudley as asking, “If we take the FDA out of it, how do we protect
people from physicians . . . that . . . will want to prey on their desperation?”). The House of
Representatives can minimize the risk of physicians coercing vulnerable patients by making
clear exactly what physicians must tell their patients about investigational drugs in the rightto-try context and thus help patients make informed decisions about their treatment options.
207. See Corieri, supra note 104.
208. See Transcript of Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Health of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, supra note 203, at 127–28.
209. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text.
210. See Fisher, supra note 166, at 58 (“[G]etting early access to new drugs is no panacea,
yet desperate patients continue to ask for it.”).
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requests211 and absorb the costs of investigational drugs—as this Note
proposes they should212—seems to be an undue burden that could dissuade
drug makers from utilizing the Right to Try pathway or perhaps even from
developing drugs at all. This certainly would not help to increase the
availability of rare-disease treatments.
This leaves doctors to counsel patients on the risks of taking experimental
drugs. And while it is impossible to predict how many patients will seek to
use the Right to Try pathway, the relatively low number of annual Expanded
Access requests indicates that legislators need not fear imposing an
unbearable or overwhelming burden on physicians.213
Moreover, to further protect patients, the House of Representatives should
amend the Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act to require that patients request
investigational drugs anonymously. Under the Expanded Access program,
patients are increasingly using social media to request investigational
drugs.214 This tactic is unfair, according to bioethics professor Arthur
Caplan, because “[p]eople who are photogenic have an advantage. You’re
not going to see some 60-year-old alcoholic in one of these [successful
investigational drug] appeals.”215 The House should thus amend the Act to
require that Right to Try requests are made anonymously—in other words,
without personal information, like a patient’s name, appearance, income, or
marital status. Without a patient’s personal information, drug makers will be
less inclined to be swayed by sympathy216 and will, instead, be better able to
objectively decide whether to provide a patient with an experimental drug.
Lastly, the House of Representatives should add a provision to the Trickett
Wendler Right to Try Act to help encourage patient participation in clinical
trials. Accessing a drug through a clinical trial, as opposed to the Expanded
Access or Right to Try pathways, is better for patients and drug sponsors
alike.217 However, patients may not be able to access clinical trials due to
211. See id. at 59.
212. This Note argues that drug sponsors, as opposed to patients or health insurers, should
absorb the costs of providing patients with investigational drugs through the Right to Try
pathway and should be incentivized to do so by receiving a reduction off the cost of the
investigational drug’s NDA. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text.
213. For example, the FDA received only 1757 Expanded Access requests in 2016. See
Michael Mezher, FDA Approved Nearly All Expanded Access Requests in FY2016, REG. AFF.
PROFESSIONALS SOC’Y (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/
2017/03/20/27157/FDA-Approved-Nearly-All-Expanded-Access-Requests-in-FY2016/
[https://perma.cc/4YUV-4ZT9].
214. Study: Social Media Is Affecting Patients’ Access to Investigational Drugs, RELIAS
(Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.ahcmedia.com/articles/139817-study-social-media-is-affectingpatients-access-to-investigational-drugs [https://perma.cc/Y3YU-6DP2]; see also Fisher,
supra note 166, at 59 (describing the “onslaught” of experimental drug requests made through
social media as “unrelenting”).
215. Fisher, supra note 166, at 59.
216. See id. at 60. For example, Dr. Amrit Ray, the chief medical officer of pharmaceutical
giant Johnson & Johnson, has described experimental drug requests as “heart-wrenching” and
claims that deciding whether to grant a patient access to such a drug is “one of the most
difficult decisions [he] face[s] as a physician.” Id.
217. Expanded Access FAQ, NORD 1 (Aug. 2016), https://rarediseases.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/NORD-Expanded-Access-FAQ_Aug2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W3HX-FNSV].
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factors like location and may be dissuaded from participation due to
responsibilities like childcare and work.218 The House should therefore
establish a fund to help patients offset some of the costs of participating in
clinical trials not covered by trial sponsors, such as lost income and
childcare.219 This would help more patients participate in clinical trials,
which would not only give patients increased access to investigational
therapies but also help drug makers recruit more racially, geographically, and
socioeconomically diverse patient populations on which to study their
products.220 Such a fund could also help drug makers better manage drug
supplies. Instead of doling out drugs on an ad hoc basis through the
Expanded Access and Right to Try pathways, drug companies would have
better control over their drug supplies and thus reduce the expenditures
associated with drug development.
CONCLUSION
As the Eteplirsen story illustrates, despite congressional efforts to facilitate
orphan-drug development, rare-disease treatments continue to be in great
demand. That one in ten Americans suffers from a rare disease and that most
rare diseases lack an FDA-approved therapy confirm that rare-disease
patients urgently need medical treatments.
If enacted as this Note suggests—by balancing the need for rare-disease
treatments with the need for patient safety—the 21st Century Cures Act and
the Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act could help meet the unmet therapeutic
needs of rare-disease patients. Specifically, if the FDA carefully scrutinizes
the source and substance of patient experience data submissions, the 21st
Century Cures Act could facilitate the development of rare-disease
treatments. The systematic collection of patient experience data may help to
build knowledge of rare diseases so that, eventually, doctors can more easily
diagnose these diseases and drug makers can develop more precise
treatments.
In the short term, the Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act could help fulfill
the more immediate needs of seriously ill rare-disease patients by allowing
them to at least attempt to treat their illnesses with experimental drugs.
However, these short-term needs can only be properly fulfilled if drug makers
are incentivized to provide patients with experimental drugs and patients give
adequate informed consent to take them.
Certainly, the 21st Century Cures Act and the Trickett Wendler Right to
Try Act will not instantly remedy the orphan-drug development, approval,
and access processes such that all rare-disease patients will instantly have
access to safe, effective treatments. If enacted carefully and in tandem,

218. See Jennifer E. Miller et al., Characterizing Expanded Access and Compassionate Use
Programs for Experimental Drugs, 10 BMC RES. NOTES, July 2017, at 1, 3; see also supra
note 86 and accompanying text.
219. See Clinical Trial Financial Assistance, supra note 86.
220. Miller et al., supra note 218, at 3.
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however, these laws could facilitate both short- and long-term access to drugs
that might benefit patients suffering from rare diseases.

